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Abstract
One way of investigating how genes affect human traits would be with
a genome-wide association study (GWAS). Genetic markers, known as
single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), are used in GWAS. This raises
privacy and security concerns as these genetic markers can be used to
identify individuals uniquely. This problem is further exacerbated by a
large number of SNPs needed, which produce reliable results at a higher
risk of compromising the privacy of participants.
We describe a method using homomorphic encryption (HE) to perform
GWAS in a secure and private setting. This work is based on a proposed
algorithm. Our solution mainly involves homomorphically encrypted ma-
trix operations and suitable approximations that adapts the semi-parallel
GWAS algorithm for HE. We leverage upon the complex space of the
CKKS encryption scheme to increase the number of SNPs that can be
packed within a ciphertext. We have also developed a cache module that
manages ciphertexts, reducing the memory footprint.
We have implemented our solution over two HE open source libraries,
HEAAN and SEAL. Our best implementation took 24.70 minutes for a
dataset with 245 samples, over 4 covariates and 10643 SNPs.
We demonstrate that it is possible to achieve GWAS with homomor-
phic encryption with suitable approximations.
Background
Genome-wide association study (GWAS) compares genetic variants, single-nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNP), to see if these variants are associated with a particular
trait. The model used in GWAS is essentially logistic regression, evaluated one
SNP at a time, corrected with covariates like age, height and weight. The num-
ber of SNPs analyzed can easily grow up to 30 million. It is estimated that it
can take around 6 hours for 6000 samples and 2.5 million SNPs [1].
Some suggest that cloud computing could offer a cost-effective and scalable
alternative that allows research to be done, given the exponential growth of
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genomic data and increasing computational complexity of genomic data analysis.
However, privacy and security are primary concerns when considering these
cloud-based solutions.
It was shown in 2004 by Lin et. al. [2] that as little as 30 to 80 SNPs could
identify an individual uniquely. Homer et. al. [3] further demonstrated that even
when DNA samples are mixed among 1000 other samples, individuals could be
identified. In light of these discoveries, regulations concerning biological data
are being updated [4]. The privacy and security of DNA-related data are now
more important than ever.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a form of encryption where functions,
f , can be evaluated on encrypted data x1, . . . , xn, yielding ciphertexts that
decrypt to f(x1, . . . , xn). Putting it in the context of GWAS, genomic data can
be homomorphically encrypted and sent to a computational server. The server
then performs the GWAS computations on the encrypted data, before sending
the encrypted outcome to the data owner for decryption. We argue that this
would ensure the privacy and security of genomic data: Throughout the entire
process, there is no instance where the server can access the data in its raw,
unencrypted form, preserving the privacy of the data. Additionally, since the
data is encrypted, no adversary would be able to make sense of the ciphertexts.
The data is thus secured on the computational server.
Motivated by these concerns, the iDASH Privacy & Security Workshop [5]
has organized several competitions on secure genomics analysis since 2011. The
aim of these competitions is to evaluate methods that provide data confiden-
tiality during analysis in a cloud environment.
In this work, we provide a solution to Track 2 of the iDASH 2018 competition
– Secure Parallel Genome-Wide Association Studies using Homomorphic En-
cryption. The challenge of this task was to implement the semi-parallel GWAS
algorithm proposed by Sikorska et. al. [6], which outperforms prior methods by
about 24 times, with HE. This task seeks to advance the practical boundaries
of HE, a continuation from last year’s HE task which was to implement logistic
regression with HE.
We propose a modification of the algorithm by Sikorska et. al. [6] for ho-
momorphically encrypted matrices. We developed a caching system to mini-
mize memory utilization while maximizing the use of available computational
resources. Our solution also leverages on the complex space of the CKKS en-
coding to store the SNP matrix and this halved the computation time needed
by doubling the number of SNPs processed each time.
Within the constraints of the competition, including a virtual machine with
16GB of memory and 200GB disk space, a security level of at least 128 bits and
at most 24 hours of runtime, our solution reported a total computation time
of 717.20 minutes. Our best implementation using a more efficient HE scheme,
which was not available during the competition, achieved a runtime of 24.70
minutes.
In the following section, we will first define some notations used in this
paper. We will begin by describing the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme
that was used to implement the GWAS algorithm. We describe our methods
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for manipulating homomorphic matrices that are crucial to our solution. We
start with our implementation of logistic regression with HE. Following that,
we adapted the GWAS algorithm using suitable approximations to simplify the
computations for HE, while preserving the accuracy of the model. We also
detail some optimizations that were used to accelerate the runtime. Finally, we
present our results and provide some discussion about our results.
Notation
Notation for HE
Let N be a power-of-two integer and R = Z[x]/〈xN + 1〉. For some integer `,
denote R` = R/2`R = Z2` [x]/〈xN + 1〉. We let λ be the security parameter
where attacks on the cryptosystem require approximately Ω(2λ) bit operations.
We use z ← D(Z) to represent sampling z from a distribution D over some
set Z. Let U denote the uniform distribution and DG(σ2) denote the discrete
Gaussian distribution with variance σ2.
Notation for GWAS
The number of samples, covariates and SNPs are denoted as n, d and k respec-
tively. Matrices are denoted in bold font uppercase letters. Let the covariates
matrix be denoted as X and the SNP matrix as S. The rows of X or S represent
the covariates or SNPs from one sample respectively. We denote the rows as
xi. Vectors are denoted in bold font lowercase letters. Let the response vector
be denoted as y. The vector of weights from the logistic model is denoted as
β and the corresponding vector of probabilities is denoted as p. The vector of
SNP effects is denoted as s. The transpose of a vector v is denoted as vᵀ. We
let d·ePO2 denote rounding up to the nearest power-of-two.
Methods
Homomorphic Encryption
HE was first proposed by Rivest et. al.[7] more than 40 years ago while the
first construction was proposed by Gentry [8] only a decade ago. For this work,
we adopt the HE scheme proposed by Cheon et. al.[9], referred to as CKKS,
which enables computation over encrypted approximate numbers. As GWAS is
a statistical function, the CKKS HE scheme is the prime candidate for efficient
arithmetic.
Most HE schemes are based on “noisy” encryptions, which applies some
“small” noise to mask messages in the encryption process. For HE, a noise bud-
get is determined when the scheme is initialized and computing on ciphertexts
depletes this pre-allocated budget. Once the noise budget is expended, decryp-
tion would return incorrect results. The CKKS scheme [9] treats encrypted
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numbers as having some initial precision, with the masking noise just smaller
than the precision. However, subsequent operations on ciphertexts increase the
size of noises and reduce the precision of the messages encrypted within. Thus,
decrypted results are approximations of their true value.
The noise budget for the CKKS scheme is initialized with the parameter L.
For every multiplication, the noise budget is subtracted by the integer p. The
noise budget for a given ciphertext is denoted as `. When the message is just
encrypted, ` = L. When ` < p, the noise budget is said to be depleted.
We provide a brief description of the CKKS scheme and highly encourage
interested readers to refer to [9] for the full details.
• KeyGen(1λ):
Let 2L be the initial ciphertext modulus. Let HWT (h) denote the distri-
bution that chooses a polynomial uniformly fromR2L , under the condition
that it has exactly h nonzero coefficients. Sample a secret s← HWT (h),
random a ← U(R2L) and error e ← DG(σ2). Set the secret key as
sk ← (1, s), public key as pk ← (b, a) ∈ R2L where b = −a · s+ e (mod L).
Finally, sample a′ ← U(R2L), e′ ← DG(σ2) and set the evaluation key
evk ← (b′, a′), where b′ = −a′ · s+ e′ + L · s2 (mod 22L).
• Encrypt(pk,m):
For m ∈ R, sample v ← U(R2L) and e0, e1 ← DG(σ2). Let v · pk + (m+
e0, e1) (mod 2
L) and output (v, L).
• Decrypt(sk, ct):
For ct = ((c0, c1), `) ∈ R2` , output c0 + c1 · s (mod 2`)
• Add(ct1, ct2):
For ct1 = ((c0,1, c1,1), `), ct2 = ((c0,2, c1,2), `), compute (c
′
0, c
′
1)←= (c0,1, c1,1)+
(c0,2, c1,2) (mod 2
`) and output (c′0, c
′
1), `).
• Mult(ct1, ct2):
For ciphertexts ct1 = ((c0,1, c1,1), `) and ct2 = ((c0,2, c1,2), `), let (d0, d1, d2) =
(c0,1c0,2, c1,1c0,2+c0,1c1,2, c1,1c1,2) (mod 2
`). Compute (c′0, c
′
1)← (d0, d1)+
b2−L · d2 · evk (mod 2`)e and output (c′0, c′1), `).
• Rescale(ct, p):
For a ciphertext ct = ((c0, c1), `) and an integer p ≤ `, output ((c′0, c′1), `−
p), where (c′0, c
′
1)← b2−p · (c0, c1)e (mod 2`−p)e.
With the CKKS scheme, we are able to encode N/2 complex numbers into
a single element in its message spaces, R. This allows us to view a ciphertext
as an encrypted array of fixed point numbers. Let φ : CN/2 → R,
• Encode(z1, z2, . . . , zN/2):
Output m = φ(z1, z2, . . . , zN/2).
• Decode(m):
Output (z1, z2, . . . , zN/2) = φ
−1(m).
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Informally, φ(·) maps (z1, . . . , zN/2) to the vector (ζj)j∈Z∗N , where ζj = bzje
and ζN−j = bzje for 1 ≤ j ≤ N/2. This (ζj) is then mapped to an element of R
with the inverse of the canonical embedding map. φ−1(·) is straightforward, an
element in R is mapped to a N -dimensional complex vector with the complex
canonical embedding map and then the relevant entries of the vector is taken
to be the vector of messages.
The ability to encode multiple numbers into one ciphertext allows us to
reduce the number of ciphertexts used and compute more efficiently. We refer
to each number encoded as a slot of the ciphertext. This offers a SIMD-like
structure where the same computation on all numbers within a ciphertext can
be done simultaneously. This means that adding or multiplying two ciphertexts
together would be equivalent to adding or multiplying each slot simultaneously.
The ciphertext of the CKKS scheme can also be transformed into another
ciphertext whose slots are a permutation of the original ciphertext.
• Rotate(ct, r): Outputs ct′ whose slots are rotated to the right by r posi-
tions.
Homomorphic Matrix Operations
In this section, we describe our method of encoding matrices with HE. The
batching property of the CKKS scheme allows us to treat ciphertexts as en-
crypted arrays. With this, we propose 4 methods of encoding a matrix with
ciphertexts.
Column-Packed (CP) Matrices.
This is our primary method of encoding a matrix. We encrypt each column of a
matrix in one ciphertext and therefore a matrix will be represented by a vector
of ciphertexts. This method of encoding a matrix was suggested by Halevi and
Shoup in [10].
We require a function, Replicate that takes a vector ν of size n and returns
vectors ν1, ν2, . . . , νn where νi for i = 1, . . . , n, is ν[i] in all positions. This is
shown in Figure 1.
1 2 3 0
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Figure 1: Replicate
We describe in Algorithm 1, a naive version of Replicate. The reader is
advised to refer to [10] for details on implementing a faster and recursive variant.
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Algorithm 1: Replicate
Input: Ciphertext ct
Output: vector〈Ciphertext〉 result
1 vector〈int〉 one = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
2 for i = 0 to ct.size do
3 one [i] = 1
4 Ciphertext temp = ct * one
5 for j = 0 to log2(ct.size)− 1 do
6 temp += Rotate(temp, 2j)
7 end
8 result[i] = temp
9 end
We first define matrix-vector multiplication between a CP matrix and a
vector in Algorithm 2. First, we invoke Replicate on the vector. Next, we
multiply each column in the left-hand side matrix with its corresponding νi.
Finally, sum up all ciphertexts and this will give the matrix-vector product.
Algorithm 2: CP-MatVecMult
Input: vector〈Ciphertext〉 A, Ciphertext b
Output: Ciphertext result
1 vector〈Ciphertext〉 colrep ← Replicate(b)
2 for i = 1 to colrep.size do
3 result += A(i) ∗ colrep(i)
4 end
Matrix multiplication between CP matrices is defined as an iterative process
over CP-MatVecMult between the left-hand side matrix and the columns of the
right-hand side matrix. This is described in Algorithm 3
Algorithm 3: CP-MatMult
Input: vector〈Ciphertext〉 A, vector〈Ciphertext〉 B
Output: vector〈Ciphertext〉 result
1 for i = 1 to B.size do
2 result[i] = CP-MatVecMult((A,B(i))
3 end
Column-Compact-Packed (CCP) Matrices.
In the case where the entries of a matrix can fit within a single vector, we
concatenate its columns and encrypt that in one ciphertext. For this type of
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matrix, we are mainly concerned with the function colSum which returns a
vector whose entries are the sum of each column. We present the pseudocode in
Algorithm 4. This is achieved by a series of rotations and additions. However,
we do not rotate for all slots of the vector, but rather log2(colSize), where
colSize is the number of rows in the CCP matrix. We note here that the final
sums are stored in every colSize slots, starting from the first slot.
Algorithm 4: colSum
Input: Ciphertext ν
Output: Ciphertext result
1 for i = 0 to log2(colsize)− 1 do
2 result += Rotate(C, 2i)
3 end
Row-Packed (RP) Matrices.
For this encoding, we encrypt rows of a matrix into a ciphertext, represent-
ing them with a vector of ciphertexts just like CP matrices. In this work, we
only consider matrix-vector multiplication between an RP matrix and a vec-
tor. Multiplication of an RP matrix by a CP matrix is a lot like naive matrix
multiplication.
To compute the multiplication of an RP matrix with a vector, we define the
dot product between two vectors encoded in two ciphertexts in Algorithm 5. For
that, we first multiply the ciphertexts together, which yields their component-
wise products. Then, we apply rotations to obtain the dot product in every slot
of the vector.
Algorithm 5: DotProd
Input: Ciphertext A, Ciphertext b
Output: Ciphertext result
1 Ciphertext C ← A ∗B
2 for i = 0 to log2(C.size)− 1 do
3 C += Rotate(C, 2i)
4 end
With DotProd, we apply it over the rows of the RP matrix with the vector,
producing several ciphertexts that each contain the dot product between a row
and said vector. Though a series of masks and additions, these separate cipher-
texts are combined into the matrix-vector product between an RP matrix and
a vector as shown in Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6: RP-MatVecMult
Input: Ciphertext A, Ciphertext b
Output: Ciphertext result
1 vector〈int〉 zero = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
2 for i = 0 to A.size do
3 zero[i] = 1
4 result += DotProd(A(i), b) ∗ zero
5 end
Row-Expanded-Packed (REP) Matrices.
This method of encoding a matrix is similar to RP matrices, except that each
entry is repeated q times for some integer q that is a power of two. As with RP
matrices, REP matrices are represented by vectors of ciphertexts. By encoding
a matrix in this manner, we reduce the number of homomorphic operations
when multiplying with other matrices. For this paper, we only consider matrix
products between CP and REP matrices.
First, we define a function, Duplicate in Algorithm 7. Suppose that a
ciphertext has k filled slots out of n, Duplicate fills the remaining slots with
repetitions of the k slots. This is shown in Figure 2.
1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0
Figure 2: Duplicate
This can be realized using simple rotations and additions.
Algorithm 7: Duplicate
Input: Ciphertext ν
Output: Ciphertext result
1 for i = 0 to log2(colsize/dkePO2)− 1 do
2 result += Rotate(C, dkePO2)
3 end
To compute matrix products between CP and REP matrices, we first apply
Duplicate the columns of the CP matrix. Then, we multiply each column in
the CP matrix with its corresponding row in the REP matrix. Finally, we sum
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all the ciphertexts and obtain the product of the matrices in a CCP matrix.
This is shown in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8: CP-REP-MatMult
Input: Ciphertext A, Ciphertext B
Output: Ciphertext result
1 for i = 0 to A.size do
2 result += Duplicate(A(i)) ∗B(i)
3 end
Logistic Regression with Homomorphic Encryption
The first step in the GWAS algorithm is to solve a logistic model for its weights
β. There are several solutions [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] that solve a logistic model with
HE, given that it was one of the challenges in the iDASH 2017 competition.
Logistic Regression.
Logistic regression estimates the parameters of a binary logistic model. Such
models are used to predict the probability of an event occurring given some input
features. These models assume that the logarithm of the odds ratio (log-odds)
is a linear combination of the input features.
Let p denote the probability of an event occurring. The assumption above
can be written as
log
(
p
1− p
)
= β0 + β1x1 + · · ·+ βdxd. (1)
Rearranging Equation (1), we get
p(x,β) =
1
1 + e−βᵀx
(2)
where β = (β0, β1, . . . , βd) and x = (1, x1, . . . , xd). This is known as the sigmoid
function.
Logistic regression estimates the regression coefficients β using maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE). This likelihood is given as
L(X,β) =
n∏
i=1
P (yi|xi)
=
n∏
i=1
p(xi,β)
yi(1− p(xi,β))1−yi .
(3)
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where xi denotes the rows of the covariates matrix X. Often, MLE is performed
with the log-likelihood
`(X,β) =
n∑
i=1
yi log(p(xi,β))
+
n∑
i=1
(1− yi) log(1− p(xi,β))
(4)
=
n∑
i=1
yi log
(
p(xi,β)
(1− p(xi,β)
)
+
n∑
i=1
log
(
1
eβᵀx + 1
) (5)
=
n∑
i=1
yi(β
ᵀxi)−
n∑
i=1
log(eβ
ᵀx + 1) (6)
Maximizing Equation (6) requires an iterative process. Our implementation
in solving the logistic model applies the Newton-Raphson method [16]. This is
because the Newton-Raphson method is known to converge quadratically [17]
and we wish to solve the model with as little iterations as possible.
The Newton-Raphson method iterates over the following equation
β(t+1) = β(t) −H−1(β(t))g(β(t)) (7)
where g and H are given as
g(β) = Xᵀ(y − p(β)), (8)
H(β) = Xᵀ(W(β))X. (9)
W(β) is defined to be a n by n diagonal matrix whose entries are pi(1− pi)
for i = 1, . . . , n. We remind the reader here that bfy is a n by 1 binary response
vector that contains the truth labels of each individual. p(β) represents the
vector of probabilities that is computed for each individual with Equation (2)
using β of the particular iteration.
A careful derivation of Equations (1) to (6) can be found in [18].
However, there are two non-HE friendly aspects in this algorithm. Firstly,
for each iteration, H is re-computed with the iteration’s β. This is computation-
ally expensive with homomorphic encryption. Secondly, the sigmoid function
Equation (2) contains the exponential function, ex which is not natively sup-
ported by HE schemes. Hence, we approximate the Hessian matrix and the
sigmoid function in our implementation.
Hessian Matrix Approximation.
We use an approximation for all Hessian matrices as suggested by Bo¨hning and
Lindsay [19]. They proposed using
H˜ =
1
4
XᵀX (10)
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as a lower bound approximation for all Hessian matrices in solving a logistic
model with the Newton-Raphson method. This approximation is also used by
Xie et. al. [20] in their distributed privacy preserving logistic regression. We
chose to precompute (XᵀX)−1 with an open source matrix library Eigen [21].
We then encrypt (XᵀX)−1 as an input to the GWAS algorithm.
Sigmoid Function Approximation.
We use the approximation from Kim et. al. [12] who proposed polynomials of
degree 3, 5, 7 as approximations of the sigmoid function. We chose the polyno-
mial of degree 7:
σ7(x) = 0.5− 1.73496
(x
8
)
+ 4.19407
(x
8
)3
− 5.43402
(x
8
)5
+ 2.50739
(x
8
)7
. (11)
Our Algorithm.
We described our algorithm for Logistic Regression with HE in Algorithm 9. We
encrypt X and (XᵀX)−1 as CP matrices and y as a ciphertext. We initialize
β in a ciphertext by encrypting a vector of zeros. We first compute Xβ with
Algorithm 2 and apply Equation (11) on to each slot in the ciphertext. Note
here that Xβ is now a vector and is represented by one ciphertext. Instead of
encrypting Xᵀ, we treat X as Xᵀ encrypted as a RP matrix. We thus invoke
RP matrix vector multiplication, Algorithm 6 with Xᵀ and (y− p). Finally, β
is updated with Equation (7).
Algorithm 9: Homomorphic LogReg
Input: X, y, (XᵀX)−1
Output: β
1 for i = 1 to κ do
2 p← σ7(Xβ).
3 g ← Xᵀ(y − p)
4 H˜−1 ← 4 (XᵀX)−1
5 βnew ← β − H˜−1g
6 β = βnew
7 end
In comparison with prior works that perform secure computation of logis-
tic regression with HE [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], our method is the first to use the
Newton-Raphson method. Gradient descent was chosen to in maximizing the
log-likelihood, Equation (6), in other implementations.
In [13], a 1-bit gradient descent method was adopted, with the FV scheme
[22]. Bootstrapping is required in this solution. [11] employed the CKKS scheme
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[9] with gradient descent. They shared two least squares approximations of the
sigmoid function. The winning solution of iDASH 2018 [12] used a gradient
descent variant - Nesterov Accelerated Gradient and introduced another ap-
proximation of the sigmoid function. [15] use bootstrapping to achieve logistic
regression for datasets larger than any of the solutions published. A unique
solution proposed in [14] attempts to approximate a closed form solution for
logistic regression.
Semi-Parallel GWAS with Homomorphic Encryption
The semi-parallel GWAS algorithm proposed by Sikorska et. al.[6] rearranges
linear model computations and leverages fast matrix operations to achieve some
parallelization and thus better performance. A logistic model is first solved with
the covariates matrix. Let z be a temporary variable
z = Xβ + W−1(y − p) (12)
where β is the weights of the logistic model, y is the response vector and p is
the vector of probabilities from evaluating the sigmoid function Equation (2)
with β.
The SNP matrix S is then orthogonalized with
S∗ = S−X (XᵀWX)−1 XᵀWS (13)
and z is orthogonalized with
z∗ = z−X (XᵀWX)−1 XᵀWz. (14)
The estimated SNP effect s can then be computed with
b =
(Wz∗)ᵀ · S∗
colsum(W(S∗)2)
(15)
and the standard error can be computed with
err =
1
colsum(W(S∗)2)
. (16)
Division here denotes element-wise division between the vectors (Wz)ᵀ ·S∗ and
colsum(W(S∗)2).
The main obstacle for HE with the semi-parallel GWAS algorithm is matrix
inversion. General matrix inversion is computationally expensive and ineffi-
cient in HE. This is mainly because integer division, which is used frequently
in matrix inversion, cannot be efficiently implemented in HE. There are two
instances where matrix inversion has to be computed. The first occurs in
Equation (12) and the second occurs in the orthogonal transformations Equa-
tions (13) and (14). In the following paragraphs, we will describe our method for
implementing the semi-parallel GWAS algorithm with HE. We will also describe
some optimizations that reduce memory consumption and accelerate computa-
tions to qualify within the competition requirements.
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Inverse of W.
We exploit the nature of W to compute its inverse with the Newton-Raphson
method in HE. Recall that W is a n by n diagonal matrix whose entries are
pi(1 − pi) for i = 1, . . . , n. Firstly, we represent the diagonal matrix W by a
vector w containing the diagonal entries to reduce storage and computational
complexity. Secondly, the inverse of a diagonal matrix is can be obtained by
inverting the entries along the main diagonal. This means that W−1 can be
computed by inverting the slots of W. The entries of w are given as pi(1− pi),
where pi ∈ [0, 1]. We claim an upper bound of 0.25 on the slots of w. The proof
is as follows: the derivative of pi(1 − pi) is 1 − 2pi for which pi = 0.5 gives a
maximium. Substituting pi = 0.5 provides the upper bound of 0.25.
We used this information to set a good initial guess of 3 in the Newton-
Raphson method. This would reduce the number of iterations needed to obtain
an accurate inverse. We describe this algorithm in Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10: inverseSlots
Input: w
Output: w−1
1 guess = [3, 3, · · · , 3]
2 for i = 1 to 3 do
3 w−1 = guess (2 - w * guess)
4 guess = w−1
5 end
Modification of Orthogonal Transformations.
We propose modifications to Equations (13) and (14) as (XᵀWX)−1 is too
expensive to be computed in the encrypted domain.
We define a placeholder matrix M as
M = I −X (XᵀX)−1 Xᵀ. (17)
We proposed a modification, inspired by the Hessian approximation in Equa-
tion (10), to the orthogonal transformation of S with
S′ = MS
= S−X (XᵀX)−1 XᵀS (18)
and z with
z′ = Mz
= z−X (XᵀX)−1 Xᵀz. (19)
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The estimated SNP effect is now computed with
b′ =
(Wz′)ᵀ · S′
colSum(W(S′)2)
. (20)
and the standard error is
err′ =
1
colsum(W(S′)2)
. (21)
Complex Space of CKKS ciphertext
For our first optimization, we exploit the scheme’s native support for complex
numbers to pack two SNPs into a single complex number, putting one SNP in
the real part and another in the imaginary part. This allows us to fit twice as
many SNPs in a single ciphertext and cut the runtime by half.
However, (S′i)
2 in Equation (20) is more difficult to compute with this pack-
ing method. Simply squaring the ciphertext does not yield the correct output
as slots now contain complex numbers; for some complex number z = x+ yi,
(x+ yi)2 = (x2 − y2) + 2xyi. (22)
Instead, we consider multiplying z by its complex conjugate z = x − yi. We
have
(x+ yi)(x− yi) = x2 + y2 (23)
Extracting the real parts of Equation (22) and Equation (23), we get
x2 =
Re(zz + z2)
2
y2 =
Re(zz − z2)
2
(24)
Recall that S′i is a CCP matrix which is represented by one ciphertext with each
slot holding one complex numbers encoding two SNPs. Thus, we compute S′iS
′
i
and S′iS′i. We assign
Seven =
S′iS′i + S
′
iS
′
i
2
(25)
and
Sodd =
S′iS′i − S′iS′i
2
(26)
Optimizations with HEAAN
There are two optimizations that we used with the HEAAN library to reduce
the parameters needed and to improve runtime.
For the first optimization, we rescale the ciphertext by a value that is smaller
than p after every plaintext multiplication. This means each plaintext multipli-
cation is now “cheaper” than a ciphertext multiplication and hence the value of
L when initialized can be lowered.
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The second optimization would be to perform only power-of-two rotations.
A rotation by τ slots is a composition of power-of-two rotations in the HEAAN
library. The required power-of-two rotations are the 1s of the binary decom-
position of τ . Thus, it would be more efficient if we only perform rotations by
a power-of-two. We illustrate this with an example. A rotation by 245 slots
would require 6 power-of-two rotations as the binary decomposition of 245 is
11110101. A rotation by 256 slots would require 1 power-of-two rotations as the
binary decomposition of 256 is 100000000. This reduces the number of rotations
in our implementation.
Batching SNPs
As S is too large to be stored in memory when encrypted, we propose to divide
S column-wise and process batches of SNPs. We show how to compute the
maximum number of SNPs that can fit within a batch. Let τ be the number
of SNPs in a batch. Consider MS, a matrix product between a n by n and a
n by τ matrix. By Algorithm 8, the result is a CCP matrix, whose ciphertext
has to have enough slots for n × τ elements. For efficiency as described in the
previous section, we round the size of each column to the nearest power-of-
two and pad the columns with zeroes. Together with the complex space of the
HEAAN ciphertext, the maximum number of SNPs that can be processed as a
batch is given as
τ =
2N−1
2× dnePO2 (27)
Smart Cache Module
We consider the largest matrix in our implementation, M which is a n by n
matrix. There is an instance where M will be stored as CCP matrix (See next
section). This means that the ciphertext would need to have at least dnePO22
slots. Consequentially, logN is at least 2× dnePO22. This results in a large set
of parameters for the HE scheme which translate to a large amount of memory
usage.
The next step requires this CCP matrix to be first converted into a CP ma-
trix. This implies that we need to manage n ciphertexts where n is the number
of individuals. This further increase the memory footprint of the algorithm.
Furthermore, the virtual machine that the iDASH organizers provide only
has 16GB RAM. As a result, we choose to move ciphertexts to the hard disk
when they are not used for computations.
We designed a cache module that exploits the vectorized ciphertext structure
of encrypted matrices. There are 4 threads on the VM provided, of which 2 is
used for reading ciphertexts from the disk while 1 is used to write ciphertext into
a file. The last thread is used for computation. A ciphertext will be pre-fetched
into memory before it is needed for computation, replacing a ciphertext that is
no longer needed.
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Our Algorithm
We give a detailed walkthrough of our modified semi-parallel GWAS algorithm
in Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11: Semi Parallel GWAS
Input: X, β, y, p, (XᵀX)−1, Xᵀ, S
Output: b′
1 β, p ← HomLogisticRegression
(
X,y, (XᵀX)−1
)
2 w← p(1− p)
3 w−1 ← inverseSlots(w)
4 z← Xβ(k) + w−1 ∗ (y − p(k−1)).
/* superscripts for β and p indicate the iteration number in
Algorithm 9 */
5 M← Id−X (XᵀX)−1 Xᵀ
6 z′ ←Mz
7 vector〈double〉 numerator, denominator
8 for batch = 1 to κ do
9 S′i ←MSi
10 encNumerator ← (w ∗ z′)ᵀ · S′i
11 numerator.insert (Decrypt (encNumerator))
12 WSS← (WS′i) · S′i
13 WSC← (WS′i) · S′i
14 denEven← 0.5 ∗ (WSC + WSS)
15 denOdd← 0.5 ∗ (WSC−WSS)
16 for i = 0 to denEven.size do
17 denominator.insert (Decrypt (denEven(i)))
18 denominator.insert (Decrypt (denOdd(i)))
19 end
20 end
21 for i = 1 to k do
22 b′i = numerator(i)/denominator(i)
23 end
First, we perform logistic regression with X, y and (XᵀX)−1 as described
in Algorithm 9. We use β from logistic regression, together with p from the
previous iteration to compute w and z.
Next, compute the inverse of the slots elements in w with inverseSlots.
Note that W−1(y − p) is equivalent to multiplying the ciphertexts w−1 and
(y− p). We then compute z′ as given in Equation (19). At this point, we have
z′ and w which are both vectors, stored in a ciphertext each.
We construct a temporary variable M = Id − X (XᵀX)−1 which is a CP
16
matrix to facilitate computations. Here, we choose to encrypt Xᵀ as a REP
matrix. The reason for encrypting differently is because multiplying a CP matrix
by a RP matrix requires the RP matrix to be first converted into REP form.
This process is very inefficient homomorphically and hence we decided to encrypt
it directly as a REP matrix. Thus, the product of X (XᵀX)−1 with Xᵀ is a
CP-REP-MatMult as shown in Algorithm 8. At this point, we M is a CCP
matrix. We then convert M into a CP matrix to compute MS.
As described earlier, we iterate over partial blocks of the SNP matrix, Si, di-
vided column-wise. Next, compute its orthogonal transformation S′i. We remind
the reader here again that MSi is computed with CP-REP-MatMult which pro-
duces a CCP matrix, S′. We compute, separately, the numerator, numerator,
and denominator, denominator, of Equation (20) for each S′i.
For numerator, we multiply w−1 and (z′) slots-wise and duplicate the slots
for as many columns in the CCP matrix S′. The vector-matrix product is now
redefined as a ciphertext multiplication, followed by calling colSum over n slots.
For denominator, the computation is similar. After squaring the slots of
the CCP matrix S′, we duplicate w and perform a slot-wise multiplication.
colSum of the resulting CCP matrix is exactly the second part of the vector-
matrix product for numerator - the accumulation sum over every n slots.
We wish to highlight here that as stated in Q15 FAQ for the competition, it
is acceptable to return numerator and denominator separately [23]. As such,
we decrypt and concatenate all numerators and denominators respectively
instead of performing a costly inversion of denominator. Finally, we divide
the two vectors element-wise to obtain the estimated SNP effect, b′.
Results
We used the provided dataset of 245 users with 4 covariates and 10643 SNPs.
The HE library used is the HEAAN library [24], commit id da3b98. The
HE parameters used are logN = 17, logL = 2440 and log p = 45. We observed
that the HEAAN context based on these parameters utilizes about 3.5GB. The
context can be thought of as the base memory needed for HE computations. Fur-
thermore, we run Rescale on the output with p = 45 for ciphertext-ciphertext
multiplications and p = 10 for ciphertext-plaintext multiplications to control
noise growth. This gives us a security level of about 93 bits based on the LWE
estimator provided by Albrecht et. al. [25].
As described earlier, we require at least dnePO22 slots, where n = 245. We
chose the minimum number of slots needed, 216 slots and set logN to be 17.
We are able to process a total of τ = 512 SNPs in each batch, based on Equa-
tion (27). This gives us a total of d10643/512e = 21 batches. We set κ = 3 for
the number of iterations in HomLogisticRegression.
We have tabulated the number of sequential homomorphic computations of
our modified GWAS algorithm in Table 1.
These numbers represent the circuit depth of the GWAS algorithm. We find
that a comparison of the number of these computations is a better measure of
17
Table 1: Depth of Homomorphic Operations
Homomorphic Operation No. Successive Operations
Plaintext Multiplication∗ 29
Ciphertext Multiplication† 40
Ciphertext Rotation 256
∗ Rescale with log p = 10.
† Rescale with log p = 45.
evaluating a HE program, independent of HE library used.
We report the time taken and memory consumed on two servers: the VM
provided by the iDASH organizers and our server.
The machine provided by the iDASH organizers is an Amazon T2 Xlarge
or equivalent VM, which has 4 vCPU, 16GB memory, disk size around 200GB
[23]. The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Time Taken and Memory Consumption with iDASH server (4 cores)
using HEAAN
Process Time Taken (min) Memory (GB)
Preprocessing∗ 0.019 0.024
Context Generation 0.65 3.55
Encryption 0.79 0.802628
Computations 717.20 3.98849
Decryption 0.32 0.063
∗ Preprocessing time includes file reading, normalizing data and computing (XᵀX)−1.
For our server, the CPU model used is Intel Xeon Platinum 8170 CPU at
2.10GHz with 26 cores and the OS used is Arch Linux. The results are shown
in Table 3.
Table 3: Time Taken and Memory Consumption with our server (22 cores) using
HEAAN
Process Time Taken (min) Memory (GB)
Preprocessing∗ 0.019 0.024
Context Generation 0.43 3.55
Encryption 0.404 0.886795
Computations 203.42 24.1119
Decryption 0.30 0.063
∗ Preprocessing time includes file reading, normalizing data and computing (XᵀX)−1.
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We evaluated the accuracy of our results with two methods. The first method
compares the vectors b and b′, counting the number of entries that are not equal.
However, since the CKKS scheme introduces some error upon decrypting, we
are unable to get any identical entries. Instead, we opt to count the number of
p-values for which our solution differs from the original algorithm by more than
some error, e. This is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: HEAAN Accuracy
Error e No. of Different Entries HEAAN Accuracy (%)
0.1 0 100
0.01 168 98.42
0.005 645 93.94
The second method would be to plot a scatter diagram whose x-axis represent
b and y-axis represent b′. Ideally, if b = b′, the best fit line of the scatter plot
should be y = x. We compute the line of best fit with the numpy.polyfit
function from python [26] and compared against the line y = x. Our HEAAN
based solution gives the line y = 1.002x + 0.0005317. The scatter plot is given
in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: HEAAN Implementation Scatter Plot
We port our implementation to the SEAL library [27] which recently re-
leased a version of the CKKS scheme that does not require the 22L modulus.
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We implemented this with 22 cores on our machine. The parameters used are
logN = 17, logL = 1680 and log p = 50. The context generated in this instance
is approximately 73.4GB. The results of this implementation is given in Table 5.
Table 5: Time Taken and Memory Consumption with our server (22 cores) using
SEAL
Process Time Taken (min) Memory (GB)
Preprocessing∗ 0.020 0.024
Context Generation 12.86 73.4
Encryption 0.20 1.60404
Computations 24.70 38.4843
Decryption 0.31 0.666103
Total 25.21 40.76
∗ Preprocessing time includes file reading, normalizing data and computing (XᵀX)−1.
The accuracy of the SEAL implementation based on the first method is
tabulated in Table 6.
Table 6: SEAL Accuracy
Error e No. of Different Entries SEAL Accuracy (%)
0.1 127 98.81
0.01 4061 61.84
0.005 5940 44.19
Our SEAL based solution gives the line y = 1.017x+ 0.007565. The scatter
plot for the results is given in Figure 4.
Discussion
In our submission, we miscalculated the security level, assuming that it fit the
128-bit requirements while it was actually about 93 bits. This is due to the
use of the modulus 22L for the evaluation key, which is a quirk of the HEAAN
library [24].
There is also a limit of 256 subjects with our implementation, due to our
desire to pack the entire test dataset into a single ciphertext. For a larger
number of subjects (up to 512), the matrix Xᵀ will need at least 512 by 512
slots, which means that logN has to be at least 19.
We are aware of the limitations in HEAAN, namely the 22L modulus and
slower homomorphic operations. However, it was the only publicly available HE
library based on the CKKS scheme.
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Figure 4: SEAL Implementation Scatter Plot
We can see that SEAL’s implementation of the CKKS scheme is superior
in terms of runtime. This is because SEAL implemented an RNS-variant of
the CKKS, which improves the speed of the algorithm by almost 8 times. The
security level of this implementation based on the LWE estimator is about 230
bits.
However, we are unable to execute our GWAS algorithm with SEAL using
κ = 3. The set of parameters that supports the depth of the algorithm with κ =
3 appears to be too large and caused our server to run out of memory. Hence,
for the implementation with SEAL, we reduced κ to 1. This reduces the depth
of the algorithm and hence the parameters that were used. Consequentially, the
accuracy of the results has decreased from 98.42% to 61.84%.
Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrated an implementation of a semi-parallel GWAS
algorithm for encrypted data. We employed suitable approximations in adapt-
ing the semi-parallel GWAS algorithm to be HE-friendly. Our solution shows
that the model trained over encrypted data is comparable to one trained over
unencrypted data. Memory constraints are shown to be of little concern with
our implementation of a smart cache, which reduced memory consumption to
fit within the limits imposed. This signifies another milestone for HE, showing
that HE is mature enough to tackle more complex algorithms.
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